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Fully device independent quantum key distribution
Umesh Vazirani∗ Thomas Vidick†
Abstract
The laws of quantum mechanics allow unconditionally secure key distribution protocols. Neverthe-
less, security proofs of traditional quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols rely on a crucial assump-
tion, the trustworthiness of the quantum devices used in the protocol. In device-independent QKD, even
this last assumption is relaxed: the devices used in the protocol may have been adversarially prepared,
and there is no a priori guarantee that they perform according to specification. Proving security in this
setting had been a central open problem in quantum cryptography.
We give the first device-independent proof of security of a protocol for quantum key distribution that
guarantees the extraction of a linear amount of key even when the devices are subject to a constant rate of
noise. Our only assumptions are that the laboratories in which each party holds his or her own device are
spatially isolated, and that both devices, as well as the eavesdropper, are bound by the laws of quantum
mechanics. All previous proofs of security relied either on the use of many independent pairs of devices,
or on the absence of noise.
1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution [BB84, Eke91] together with its proof of security [May01, SP00] appeared to
have achieved the holy grail of cryptography — unconditional security, or a scheme whose security was
based solely on the laws of physics. However, practical implementations of QKD protocols necessarily
involve imperfect devices [BBB+92, MHH+97], and it was soon realized that these imperfections could be
exploited by a malicious eavesdropper to break the “unconditional” security of QKD (see e.g. [SK09] for a
review).
Mayers and Yao [MY98] put forth a vision for restoring unconditional security in the presence of im-
perfect or even maliciously designed devices, by subjecting them to tests that they fail unless they behave
consistently with “honest” devices. The fundamental challenge they introduced was of device-independent
quantum key distribution (DIQKD): establishing the security of a QKD protocol based only on the validity
of quantum mechanics, the physical isolation of the devices and the passing of certain statistical tests. The
germ of the idea for device-independence may already be seen in Ekert’s original entanglement-based pro-
tocol for QKD [Eke91], and was made more explicit by Barrett, Hardy, and Kent [BHK05], who showed
how to generate a single random bit secure against any non-signalling eavesdropper. A long line of re-
search on DIQKD seeks to make the qualitative argument from [BHK05] quantitative, devising protocols
that extract an amount of key that is linear in the number of uses of the devices, and is secure against in-
creasingly general eavesdropping strategies. Initial works [AGM06, AMP06, SGB+06] give efficient and
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noise-tolerant protocols that are secure against individual attacks by non-signalling eavesdroppers. Sub-
sequent work [MRC+09, Mas09] and [HRW10] also proved security against collective attacks. Other
works [ABG+07, PAB+09, MRC+09, HR10, MPA11] obtain better key rates under the stronger assumption
that the eavesdropper is bound by the laws of quantum mechanics. All these results, however, could only be
established under restrictive independence assumptions on the devices, e.g. in recent work [HR10, MPA11]
a proof of security based on collected statistics requires that the n uses of each device are causally indepen-
dent: measurements performed at successive steps of the protocol commute with each other.
Very recently two papers [BCK12b, RUV12] announced proofs of security of DIQKD without requir-
ing any independence assumption between the different uses of the devices. Unfortunately, although the
approaches in [BCK12b, RUV12] are very different both implied protocols are polynomially inefficient and
unable to tolerate noisy devices. The protocol used in [BCK12b] is very similar to the one originally intro-
duced in [BHK05], and requires a large number of uses of a pair of noise-free devices in order to generate
a single bit of key. In the case of [RUV12], DIQKD is obtained as a corollary of very strong testing that
allows the shared quantum state and operators of the two untrusted devices to be completely characterized.
It is an open question whether such strong testing can be achieved in a manner that is robust to noise.
A major issue in QKD is dealing with the noise inherent in even the best devices. Indeed, a good
DIQKD protocol should differentiate devices that are “honest but noisy” from devices that may attempt to
take advantage of the protocol’s necessary noise tolerance in order to leak information to an eavesdropper
by introducing correlations in their “errors” [BCK12a]. The protocols in [BCK12b, RUV12] do not achieve
this, since they cannot tolerate any constant noise rate. This raises the question: is device-independent QKD
even possible without independence assumptions in a realistic, noise-tolerant scenario?
1.1 Results
We answer this question in the affirmative by giving the first complete device-independent proof of security
of quantum key distribution that tolerates a constant noise rate and guarantees the generation of a linear
amount of key. Our only assumption on the devices is that they can be modeled by the laws of quantum
mechanics, and that they are spatially isolated from each other and from any adversary’s laboratory. In
particular, we emphasize that the devices may have quantum memory. While the proof of security is quite
non-trivial (it builds upon ideas from the work on certifiable randomness generation mentioned below), the
actual protocol whose device independence properties we establish is quite simple. It is a small variant of
Ekert’s entanglement-based protocol [Eke91].
In the protocol, the users Alice and Bob make m successive uses of their respective devices. At each
step, Alice (resp. Bob) privately chooses a random input xi ∈ {0, 1, 2} (resp. yi ∈ {0, 1}) for her device,
collecting an output bit ai (resp. bi). If the devices were honestly implemented they would share Bell states
|ψ〉 = 1/√2|00〉 + 1/√2|11〉, and measure their qubits according to the following strategy: if xi = 0
measure in the computational basis, if xi = 1 measure in the Hadamard basis and if xi = 2 measure in the
3pi/8-rotated basis. If yi = 0 measure in the pi/8-rotated basis and if yi = 1 measure in the 3pi/8-rotated
basis.
To test the devices, after the m steps have been completed, the users select a random subset B ⊆
{1, . . . , m} of size |B| = γm, where γ > 0 is a small constant, and publicly announce their inputs and
outputs in B. Rounds in B will be called “Bell rounds”. Let zi = 1 if and only if ai 6= 2 and ai ⊕ bi 6= xi ∧ yi,
or (ai, bi) = (2, 1) and ai 6= bi. The users jointly compute the noise rate η := (1/|B|)∑i∈B zi − (1−opt),
where opt = (2 cos2 pi/8 + 1)/3.1 If η ≥ 0.5%, say, they abort. If not, they announce their remaining
1This corresponds to estimating the average amount by which the devices’ outputs in B differ from a maximal violation of a
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input choices. Let C ⊆ {1, . . . , m} be the steps in which (ai, bi) = (2, 1). We will call the rounds in C the
“check rounds”; outputs from the rounds C− B constitute the raw key. The users conclude by performing
standard information reconciliation and privacy amplification steps, extracting a key of length κm for some
κ = κ(η, ε), where ε is the desired security parameter. (We refer to Figures 1 and 2 for a more detailed
description of the protocol.)
Theorem 1 (Informal). Let m be a large enough integer and ε = 2−c0m, where c0 > 0 is a small constant.
Given any pair of spatially isolated quantum devices A and B, the protocol described above generates a
shared key K of length κm, where κ ≈ 1.4%, that is ε-secure: the probability that the users Alice and Bob
do not abort and that the adversary can obtain information about the key is at most ε.
This informal statement hides a tradeoff between the parameters ε, η, and κ: the larger the security
parameter ε and the smaller the noise rate η, the higher the key rate κ. As η → 0 (provided ε is chosen large
enough) our proof guarantees a secure key rate κ ≈ 2.5%, which with our setting of parameters corresponds
to about 15% of the raw key. Conversely, the maximum noise rate for which we may extract a key of positive
length is ηmax ≈ 1.2%. This is worse than the optimal key rates obtained under the causal independence
assumption [MPA11], but still quite reasonable.
1.2 Proof overview and techniques
We start with the observation that the randomness in the shared secret key must necessarily be generated by
the two devices. Indeed, even though the users have the ability to generate perfect random bits privately,
such bits cannot be used directly for the shared key, since any information transmitted about them is also
available to the adversary. It follows that a necessary condition for DIQKD is that the users should be
able to use their untrusted devices to generate certified randomness — randomness they can guarantee was
not pre-encoded in the devices by the adversary, nor obtained as some function of the users’ inputs to the
devices.
Luckily, the possibility of generating certified randomness has already been investigated. Building on an
observation made in [Col06], Pironio et al. [PAM+10] devised a protocol in which the generation of random-
ness could be certified solely by testing for a sufficiently large Bell inequality violation. In [FGS11, PM11]
it was further shown that the randomness generated was secure against an arbitrary classical adversary. Con-
currently, in [VV11] we gave a protocol that was secure even against a quantum adversary. This last protocol
provides us with a solid starting point for DIQKD, since our goal is to prove that the quantum adversary,
who may have fabricated the two devices, has no information about the shared random key. Nevertheless,
extending this to DIQKD presents us with some serious new challenges.
1. First, QKD is a task that involves two distant parties Alice and Bob. Any classical communication
between Alice and Bob must take place in the clear and is therefore accessible to the adversary, thus
giving her additional power.
2. Second, in order to achieve QKD it is not sufficient just to generate randomness — the point of QKD is
that Alice and Bob share the same random key. In our protocol this is accomplished by distinguishing
two different types of rounds: Bell rounds, in which the violation of the CHSH inequality by the
devices is estimated, and check rounds, in which the devices are supposed to produce identical outputs
from which the key will be generated. Unfortunately Alice and Bob must exchange information about
which rounds are which, and since the adversary has access to all communicated classical information,
Bell inequality based on the CHSH inequality [CHSH69, BC90]: see Section 2 for details.
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this appears to render the Bell rounds pointless, since the adversary can ignore the Bell rounds and
attack only those rounds which are used to generate the key (the check rounds).
3. Finally, to be practical the protocol should tolerate noisy devices. As a result, the users can only
expect a non-maximal amount of correlation, both in the Bell and check rounds. The randomness-
certification protocol from [VV11] did not tolerate any noise — in fact, the absence of noise played
a crucial role in the proof. As we already explained in the introduction, dealing with the presence of
noise is one of the major conceptual and technical hurdles of the proof.
We now explain how our proof technique addresses these challenges. The proof proceeds in two steps.
As a first step, we argue that the following three conditions cannot hold simultaneously in any single round
of the protocol: (i) the devices violate the CHSH inequality, whenever the round was selected as a Bell
round (ii) the adversary can predict Bob’s output, whenever the round was selected as a check round, and
(iii) the no-signalling condition is satisfied between all three parties (Alice, Bob and the adversary). To
derive a contradiction from (i)–(iii) we use a simple conceptual tool called the “guessing game”, which was
introduced in [VV11]. The main idea is that conditions (i) and (ii) imply that the adversary and Alice will
be able to team up to predict Bob’s output from their sole respective input/output behavior, violating the
no-signalling condition (iii).
The second step is more challenging. All previous works on the subject reduced the general setting to a
single-round scenario similar to the one outlined above by requiring some form of independence assumption
on the devices or on the adversary’s attack. We do not use any such assumption, and the main challenge is
to deal with correlations between all rounds and the adversary in order to perform the reduction.
Our starting point is the existence of a pair of devices that pass the protocol with non-negligible prob-
ability, but such that the adversary may gain non-negligible information about the secret key generated at
the end of the protocol. Our goal is to show the existence of a round i0 of the protocol in which conditions
(i)–(iii) above are satisfied, thus deriving a contradiction.
Our argument has two main ingredients. The first ingredient is the so-called “quantum reconstruction
paradigm”, a technique that was introduced in [DV10] and further developed in [DPVR12, VV11]. What
this achieves is the following: any adversary able to obtain non-negligible information about the generated
key can be transformed into a seemingly much stronger adversary: she can predict the entire string of
outputs of Bob’s device on the check rounds (the rounds used to generate the key). Furthermore, the success
probability of this “guessing measurement” is of the same order as the original distinguishing probability
but does not depend on the length of the key — a fact that will be crucial to obtaining good parameters. In
order to achieve this, the new adversary requires access to the same public information as the original one,
together with a small number of additional “advice bits” taken from Bob’s string of outputs.
This stronger form of the adversary guarantees that condition (ii) above holds in all rounds with small
but non-negligible probability. Furthermore, the checking performed as part of the protocol ensures that
(i) also holds on average over all rounds, with probability of the same order. The natural idea in order to
identify a round i0 in which conditions (i) and (ii) hold simultaneously with high probability is to perform
conditioning: there must exist many rounds i such that, provided both conditions hold in rounds 1 to i − 1,
they must hold in round i with high probability.
Such conditioning, however, presents a new difficulty: it may introduce such correlations that condition
(iii) is no longer satisfied. Indeed, recall that one of the main difficulties in analyzing the QKD protocol is
that the adversary has considerable power, due to the large amount of public information that is leaked by the
protocol — including the users’ complete choice of inputs. Hence conditioning on a low probability event
involving the outcome of a measurement performed by the adversary on her system introduces correlations
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between inputs in all rounds. For instance, this conditioning could very well force the inputs in round i0 to
be a particular pair, say (0, 0), making the guarantees (i) and (ii) all but useless.
The difficulty is reminiscent of one encountered in the analysis of parallel repetition, where conditioning
on success in a subset of the parallel repeated games may introduce correlations among the players in the
remaining games. Here, the situation is further complicated by the fact that it involves three parties involved
in a relatively complex interaction. In particular, the conditioning is performed jointly on an event involving
Alice and Bob (the CHSH violation observed in previous rounds being sufficiently large) on the one hand,
and Bob and Eve (Eve’s guess being correct) on the other.
The final step in our proof consists in bounding the amount of correlation introduced by the conditioning.
For this we use tools from information theory, including the chain rule for mutual information and the
quantum Pinsker’s inequality, which had not previously been applied to this setting. (Similar tools were
already used by Holenstein in his derivation of a parallel repetition theorem for the case of two-player
games with no-signalling players [Hol09].)
1.3 Perspective
We have not attempted to optimize the relationship between the parameters κ, η and ε describing the key
rate, the noise rate and the security parameter respectively, and it is likely that the explicit dependency
stated in Theorem 8 can be improved by tightening our arguments. It is an interesting question to find out
whether our approach can lead to a trade-off as good as the one that has been shown to be achievable under
additional assumptions on the devices [MPA11]. One possibility for improvement would be to bias the
users’ input distribution towards the pair of inputs (2, 1) from which the raw key is extracted, as was done
in e.g. [AMP06]: indeed, only a very small fraction of the rounds are eventually required to estimate the
violation of the CHSH condition.
Our proof crucially makes use of quantum mechanics to model the devices and the adversary. Can one
obtain a fully device-independent proof of security of QKD against adversaries that are only restricted by
the no-signalling principle? Barrett et al. [BCK12b] recently showed that such security is achievable in
principle; however their protocol is highly inefficient and does not tolerate noisy devices.
Organization of the paper. We start with some preliminaries in Section 2, introducing our notation, the
information-theoretic quantities that will be used. We also summarize the main parameters of our protocol,
which is described in Figures 1 and 2. In Section 3 we formally state our result and outline the security proof.
The two main ingredients are the analysis of Protocol B, which is given in Section 4, and the “quantum
reconstruction paradigm” introduced in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 contains probabilistic and information-
theoretic lemmas used in some of the proofs.
Acknowledgments. We thank Anthony Leverrier for many useful comments on a preliminary version of
this manuscript.
2 Preliminaries
We assume familiarity with basic concepts and standard notation in quantum information, including den-
sity matrices and distance measures such as the trace distance and the fidelity. We refer the reader to the
books [NC00, Wil11] for detailed introductions.
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Notation. We use roman capitals A, B, . . . , X both to refer to random variables and the registers, classical
or quantum, that contain them. Calligraphic letters A,B, . . . ,X are used to refer to the underlying Hilbert
space. D (X ) denotes the set of density operators (non-negative matrices with trace 1) onX . For an arbitrary
matrix A on X we let ‖A‖1 = Tr
√
AA† denote its Schatten 1-norm. ln denotes the natural logarithm and
log the logarithm in base 2. For x ∈ [0, 1], H(x) = −x log x − (1− x) log(1− x) is the binary entropy
function.
Information theoretic quantities. Given a density matrix ρ ∈ D (A), its von Neuman entropy is H(ρ) :=
−Tr(ρ ln ρ). For a classical-quantum state ρXA = ∑x px|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx ∈ D (X ⊗A), where for every x,
ρx ∈ D (A), the conditional entropy is defined as H(A|X)ρ := ∑x px H(ρx). Given a state ρABX, where
X is classical, the conditional mutual information is
I(A : B|X)ρ := H(A|X)ρ + H(B|X)ρ − H(AB|X)ρ.
We will use the following quantum analogue of the classical Pinsker’s inequality (see e.g. Theorem 11.9.1
in [Wil11] for a proof): for any ρAB ∈ D (AB),
∥∥ρAB − ρA ⊗ ρB∥∥21 ≤ (2 ln 2) I(A : B)ρ. (1)
The most important information measure in our context is the quantum conditional min-entropy, first intro-
duced in [Ren05], and defined as follows.
Definition 2. Let ρAB be a bipartite density matrix. The min-entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
Hmin(A|B)ρ := max{λ ∈ R : ∃σB ∈ D (B) s.t. 2−λ IdA ⊗σB ≥ ρAB}.
We will often drop the subscript ρ when there is no doubt about the underlying state. The smooth
min-entropy is defined as follows.
Definition 3. Let ε ≥ 0 and ρAB a bipartite density matrix. The ε-smooth min-entropy of A conditioned on
B is defined as
Hεmin(A|B)ρ := max
ρ˜AB∈B(ρAB,ε)
Hmin(A|B)ρ˜,
where B(ρAB, ε) is a ball of radius ε around ρAB.2
The CHSH condition. The security of our DIQKD protocol is based on the statistical verification that
the pair of devices used have an input/output behavior consistent with certain pre-determined correlations,
which are those expected of a “honest” quantum-mechanical pair of devices performing the measurements
described below.
Let A and B designate two spatially isolated devices. In the protocol, there are three possible choices of
inputs x ∈ {0, 1, 2} to A, and two possible inputs y ∈ {0, 1} to B. Each of the 6 possible pairs of inputs is
chosen with uniform probability 1/6. The devices are required to produce outputs a, b ∈ {0, 1} respectively.
The users select a random subset of the rounds of the protocol in which to evaluate the frequency with which
the following constraints are satisfied. In case both inputs were in {0, 1}, the constraint on the outputs is the
CHSH parity constraint a ⊕ b = x ∧ y [CHSH69]. If the inputs are (2, 1) the constraint is that the outputs
2Theoretically any distance measure could be used to define an ε-ball. As has become customary, we use the purified distance,
P(ρ, σ) :=
√
1− F(ρ, σ)2, where F(·, ·) is the fidelity.
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(a, b) should satisfy a ⊕ b = 0. Finally, for the remaining pair of inputs (2, 0) all pairs of outputs are valid.
We will refer to this set of constraints collectively as “the CHSH condition”. We note that the underlying
Bell inequality is similar to the so-called “chained inequality” for two inputs [BC90].
Let opt be the maximum probability with which any two isolated devices, obeying the laws of quan-
tum mechanics, may produce outputs satisfying the CHSH condition. It is not hard to show that opt =
(2/3) cos2 pi/8 + (1/3), which is achieved using the following strategy. The devices are initialized in
a single EPR pair |Ψ〉 = (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2, each device holding one qubit. On input 0, A performs a
measurement in the computational basis, and on input 1 it measures in the Hadamard basis. On input 0, B
measures in the computational basis rotated by pi/8. If A gets input 2, or if B gets input 1, they measure in
the computational basis rotated by 3pi/8. The devices may be used repeatedly, and honest devices perform
measurements on a fresh EPR pair at each use.
Parameters. For convenience, we summarize here the main parameters of the key distribution protocol
described in Figures 1 and 2.
• m is the total number of rounds in the protocol (in each round, an input to each of A,B is chosen, and
an output is collected).
• B are the “Bell rounds”, selected to perform parameter estimation. They are chosen uniformly at
random under the constraint that |B| = γm, for some γ > 0 specified in the protocol.
• η is the tolerated error rate: the protocol aborts as soon as the fraction of rounds in B satisfying the
CHSH condition is lower than opt− η.
• C ⊆ [m] are the “check rounds”. Those are rounds in which the inputs to (A,B) are (2, 1). Since the
inputs are chosen uniformly at random, the number of check rounds |C| is highly concentrated around
m/6.
• The target min-entropy rate κ. This is the rate of min-entropy that the users Alice and Bob expect to
be present in the check rounds, provided the protocol did not abort. Once information reconciliation
and privacy amplification have been performed, a secret key of length roughly (κ − H(2η))|C| will
be produced.
• ε is the security parameter: the statistical distance from uniform of the extracted key (conditioned on
the eavesdropper’s side information). Precisely, if K denotes the system containing the extracted key,
we will obtain that ‖ρKE ′ − ρUK ⊗ ρE ′‖1 ≤ ε, where E ′ is a register containing all the side information
available to an arbitrary quantum eavesdropper in the protocol, and ρUK is the totally mixed state on
as qubits as the key length.
3 Analysis of the key distribution protocol
The analysis of Protocol A, and the proof of Theorem 1, is performed in two steps. The first, main step
consists in proving a lower bound on the quantum smooth conditional min-entropy Hεmin(BC|XYABBBE)
of the outputs obtained by Bob in the check rounds C (conditioned on the protocol not aborting). This lower
bound will depend on the maximal error rate η that is tolerated by the users in the sub-protocol B (see Fig-
ures 1 and 2 for a description of protocols A and B respectively). Here the lower bound is taken conditioned
on the state of an arbitrary quantum adversary (whom we will call Eve and refer to indiscriminately as “the
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Protocol A
1. Let m and ε, η > 0 be parameters given as input. Let Cγ be the constant from Theorem 8, and set
γ = (Cγ/η2) ln(1/ε)/m.
2. Alice and Bob run Protocol B for m steps, choosing inputs x ∈ {0, 1, 2}m (resp. y ∈ {0, 1}m) and
obtaining outcomes a ∈ {0, 1}m (resp. b ∈ {0, 1}m). Let B be the set of rounds that were chosen to
perform parameter estimation.
3. Alice and Bob publicly reveal their choices of inputs. Let C be the set of rounds i in which (xi, yi) =
(2, 1). If ||C| −m/6| > 10√m they abort the protocol.
4. Alice and Bob perform information reconciliation on their outputs in C−B, which constitute the raw
key. For this, Bob sends a message of ℓ ≤ H(2η)|C|+ log(2/ε) bits to Alice.
5. Let κ = κ(η) be as specified in Theorem 8. Alice and Bob perform privacy amplification using e.g.
two-universal hashing, extracting a shared key of length (κ − H(2η) −O(log(1/ε)/m))|C| from
the common (|C| − |B|)-bit string they obtained at the end of the previous step.
Figure 1: The device-independent key distribution protocol, Protocol A
Protocol B
1. Let m, γ and η be parameters given as input.
2. Repeat, for i = 1, . . . , m:
2.1 Alice picks xi ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and Bob picks yi ∈ {0, 1}, uniformly at random. They input xi, yi
into their respective device, obtaining outputs ai, bi ∈ {0, 1} respectively.
3. Alice chooses a random subset B ⊆ [m] of size γm and shares it publicly with Bob. Alice and
Bob announce their input/output pairs in B, and compute the fraction of pairs satisfying the CHSH
condition. Let (opt− η′) be this fraction. If η′ > η they abort the protocol.
Figure 2: Theorem 8 shows that, at the end of protocol B, the bits BC generated by Bob’s device in the
check rounds C both have high smooth min-entropy, conditioned on the adversary’s arbitrary quantum side
information.
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adversary” or “the eavesdropper”) in the protocol, who has access to the information X, Y, AB, BB revealed
publicly in the course of the protocol, as well as to a quantum system E which may be correlated with the
systems A, B of the devices. Such an estimate is stated in Theorem 8 in Section 3.3 below.
The second step consists in showing that there exists appropriate protocols for the information reconcil-
iation and privacy amplification steps, Steps 4 and 5 in Protocol A respectively, such that the lower bound
on the conditional min-entropy from the first step guarantees the security (distance from uniform from the
point of view of the adversary) and correctness (Alice and Bob should obtain the same key) of the key that
is extracted. This step is standard, and all the ingredients required already appear in the literature. We
summarize the result as Lemma 4 in Section 3.2 below.
Theorem 1 follows immediately by combining Theorem 8 and Lemma 4.
3.1 Probability space
Before stating and proving formally our results, we formally define the random variables and events that
will be used in their proof.
Modeling the devices. Fix a pair of spatially isolated devices (A,B). Device A takes inputs in {0, 1, 2},
and device B takes inputs in {0, 1}. Whenever provided an input, each device produces an output in {0, 1}.
The devices may be used repeatedly. We will assume that the pair (A,B) can be described by quantum
mechanics: the devices are modeled by a pair of quantum registers; when provided an input each device
performs a measurement on the state contained in the corresponding subsystem.
We assume that user Alice holds A, and Bob is given B. In addition, there is an adversary Eve who
holds an additional quantum register E , initialized in a state arbitrarily correlated with that of A and B. Let
ρA1B1E be the density matrix describing the joint state of all three registers at the start of the protocol.
We define the following random variables and events. X ∈ {0, 1, 2}m and Y ∈ {0, 1}m are two uni-
formly distributed random variables, used to represent the inputs to A,B respectively, as chosen in the
protocol. A, B ∈ {0, 1}m are random variables denoting the outputs produced by the devices, when se-
quentially provided their respective inputs X, Y. We will always use C ⊆ [m] to denote the set of “check”
rounds, in which (Xi, Yi) = (2, 1), and B ⊆ [m] the set of “Bell” rounds chosen by Alice and Bob to
perform parameter estimation.
Let ρAiBi denote the reduced state of devices A and B in the i-th round of the protocol (before they have
been provided their i-th input). Formally,
ρAiBi ∝
(
∏
j<i
M
Aj
Xj
⊗ NBjYj
)
ρA1B1
(
∏
j<i
(
M
Aj
Xj
)† ⊗ (NBjYj
)†)
,
where {MAjXj } and {N
Bj
Yj
} are the Kraus operators corresponding to the measurement performed by devices
A and B in round j respectively, and ρAiBi is normalized. Here ρA1B1 = TrE (ρA1B1E ) is the reduced state
of the devices at the start of the protocol. It is important to note that for any i the state ρAiBi may depend on
a measurement that is performed on system E as soon as a particular outcome of that measurement is fixed.
Measuring the CHSH condition. Given a set S ⊆ [m] and δ > 0, CHSHAB(S, δ) is the event that the
tuple (X, Y, A, B) satisfies the CHSH condition (as described in Section 2) in a fraction at least opt− δ of
the rounds indicated by S. If S is omitted, CHSHAB(δ) = CHSHAB([m], δ). Letting Z ∈ {0, 1}m be the
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indicator random variable of the CHSH condition not being satisfied in any given round, we can write
CHSHAB(S, δ) ≡
{ 1
|S| ∑
i∈S
Zi ≤ (1− opt) + δ
}
.
We also define VIOLAB(i), where i ∈ [m], to express the expected amount by which the CHSH condition
in round i is satisfied:
VIOLAB(i) = E[ Zi ]− (1− opt),
where here the expectation is taken over the choice of inputs (Xi, Yi) in round i, and over the randomness
in the devices’ own measurements in round i. Note that VIOLAB(i) implicitly depends on the specific state
of the devices in round i, which may be affected by previous input and outputs obtained in the protocol
as well as on other events that may be conditioned on. Hence the expression Pr(VIOLAB(i) < δ|E), for
some event E, indicates the average probability, over all possible e ∈ E, that the devices satisfy the CHSH
condition in round i with probability at least opt− δ, provided their inputs are distributed according to the
conditional distribution (Xi, Yi)|E = e, and when performed on the post-measurement state of A ⊗ B in
round i conditioned on E = e. For any δ > 0 we let VIOLAB(δ) be the event that (1/m)∑i VIOLAB(i) ≤
δ.
The adversary. We introduce additional random variables that depend on the adversary Eve, holding the
quantum register E . The adversary is described in Lemma 9 below; to understand the events below it may
be useful to read that lemma’s statement first.
Let E ∈ {0, 1}|C| be the random variable that describes the outcome of the measurement on E described
in Lemma 9. Note that this outcome depends on the “advice” that is given to the adversary. We use Xˆ, Yˆ to
denote the inputs that are given to the adversary, and ˆADV ∈ {0, 1}αm to denote the additional advice bits.
These random variables need not equal the actual values X, Y, ADV: in general, the adversary’s measure-
ment is well-defined for any given advice bits, and E is used to denote its outcome irrespective of whether
the advice given was “correct” or not. For any i ∈ [m], define GUESSBE (i) ∈ {0, 1} to be 1 if and only if,
either i ∈ C and Ei = Bi, or i /∈ C, and let GUESSBE = ∧iGUESSBE (i).
3.2 Information reconciliation and privacy amplification
For convenience, we let E ′ := XYABBBE denote the side information available to the eavesdropper. We
show the following lemma, whose proof follows from standard arguments in the analysis of QKD protocols
(see e.g. [Ren05]). We provide the relevant details below.
Lemma 4. Let γ, ε > 0. Let ε′ = 2e−γ|C|/400. Suppose that, after Step 2 of Protocol A, the condition
Hεmin(BC|E ′) ≥ κ|C| is satisfied. Then with probability at least 1− ε′, at the end of the protocol Alice and
Bob have a common shared key that is 2ε-close to uniform and has length Hεmin(BC|E ′)− H(1.1η)|C| −
4 log(1/ε).
Information reconciliation. We first analyze the information reconciliation step. The following lemma
states the conditions that are required for there to exist a satisfactory information reconciliation procedure.
Lemma 5 (Lemma 6.3.4 in [Ren05]). Let A, B ∈ {0, 1}k be two random variables, and ε > 0. Suppose
Alice holds A, and Bob holds B. There is an information reconciliation protocol in which Bob communicates
ℓ ≤ Hεmax(B|A) + log(2/ε) bits of information about B to Alice and is such that with probability at least
1− ε Alice and Bob both know B at the end of the protocol.
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To apply Lemma 5 it suffices to prove an upper bound on the conditional max-entropy Hεmax(BC|AC).
By definition of the rounds C, the CHSH condition in those rounds imposes that Ai = Bi for all i ∈ C.
Hence, were it not for errors, we would have Hεmax(B|A) = 0. The following claim shows that the bound
on the error rate that results from the estimation performed in the rounds B in Step 3 of Protocol B is enough
to guarantee a good upper bound on the conditional max-entropy.
Claim 6. Suppose Alice and Bob do not abort after Step 3 in Protocol B. Let C be the set of check rounds,
as designated in Step 4 of Protocol A. Then Hε′max(BC|CC) ≤ H(1.1η)|C|, where ε′ = 2e−γ|C|/400.
Proof. Fix the set C. The set B chosen by Alice and Bob to perform parameter estimation contains a fraction
at least γ/2 of the rounds in C, except with probability at most e−γ|C|/8. The protocol is aborted as soon as
more than an η fraction of those rounds are such that ai 6= bi. Hence with probability at least 1− e−γ|C|/200
the total fraction of errors in C is at most 1.1η. In particular, with probability at least 1− e−γ|C|/400 over
AC, with probability at least 1− e−γ|C|/400, BC will take on at most 2H(1.1η)|C| values.
Privacy amplification. The following lemma states the existence of a good protocol for privacy amplifi-
cation.
Lemma 7 (Lemma 6.4.1 in [Ren05]). Suppose the information reconciliation protocol requires at most ℓ
bits of communication. Then for any ε > 0 there is a privacy amplification protocol based on two-universal
hashing which extracts Hεmin(BC|E ′)− ℓ− 2 log(1/ε) bits of key.
Lemma 4 now follows directly by combining Claim 6 with Lemma 7 and the assumption on the condi-
tional min-entropy placed in the lemma.
3.3 A lower bound on the conditional min-entropy
The main result of this section is a lower bound on the conditional smooth min-entropy Hεmin(BC|XYABBBE)
of the raw key.
Theorem 8. Let η > 0 be given. There exists positive constants Cε, Cγ (possibly depending on η) such
that the following hold. Let m be an integer and ε ≥ e−Cεm be given. Let γ = (Cγ/η2) ln(1/ε)/m be as
specified in Protocol A (Figure 1). Let κ be any constant such that κ < (√2− 1)/(4 ln(2))− (4/ ln(2))η.
Suppose that the devices A, B are such that with probability at least ε the protocol does not abort.
Let E be an auxiliary system held by an eavesdropper, who may also learn (X, Y) and (AB, BB). Then,
conditioned on the protocol not aborting, it holds that
Hεmin(BC|XYABBBE) ≥ κ|C| −O
(
ln(1/ε)
)
.
We note that the precise relation between the parameters κ and η stated in the theorem is the one that
we obtain from our proof; however we have not attempted to optimize it fully and it is likely that one may
be able to derive a better dependency. It is also clear from the proof that one may trade off the different
constants between each other, depending on whether one is interested in the maximum possible key rate in
the presence of very small noise, or to the opposite if one wishes to tolerate as much noise as possible.
The proof of Theorem 8 is based on three lemmas. We state the lemmas first, and derive the theorem
from them below.
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3.3.1 The reconstruction lemma
Our first lemma states that, if the min-entropy condition in the conclusion of the theorem is not satisfied,
then there must exist a measurement on the system E , depending on X, Y, AB and BB, together with some
additional “advice” bits of information about BC, whose outcome E ∈ {0, 1}|C| agrees with BC with non-
negligible probability.
Lemma 9. Let κ > 0 and suppose that Hεmin(BC|XYABBBE) < κ|C|. Then there exists an α = κ|C|/m +
2γ + O(log(m/ε)/m) and a function f : {0, 1}|C| → {0, 1}(α−2γ)m such that, given the bits ADV =
fADV(BC)ABBB ∈ {0, 1}αm together with the inputs X, Y, there exists a measurement on E that outputs a
string e ∈ {0, 1}|C| such that with probability (over the randomness in B and in the measurement) at least
CE(ε/m)
6
, where CE is a universal constant, the equality e = bC holds.
The proof of Lemma 9 is based on a “reconstruction”-type argument from [DPVR12]. A very similar
argument was already used to establish an analogous lemma in [VV11]. We give the proof of Lemma 9 in
Section 5.
3.3.2 Existence of a good round
Our second lemma states the existence of a “good” round i0 ∈ [m] in which both the CHSH condition is
satisfied, and the outcome Ei0 of the measurement described in Lemma 9 agrees with Bi0 , with good prob-
ability. Note also the additional condition (2) in the lemma, which states that systems A and B are each
close to being independent from the random variables Xi0 , Yi0 describing the choice of inputs in round i0.
This condition is necessary for condition (3), on the CHSH violation, to be of any use: indeed, without (2)
it could in principle be that the conditioning on specific outcomes in previous rounds, including the adver-
sary’s outcomes, completely fixes the choice of inputs in the i0-th round. Conditions (2)–(4) in the lemma
correspond to conditions (i)–(iii) discussed in Section 1.2.
Eq. (2) implies that the distribution that arises from the devices’ measurements on the states ρAi0Bi0 is,
while not necessarily quantum, still no-signalling, and this is all that is required for the application of the
guessing lemma, Lemma 11 below. As explained in the introduction, proving this condition is an impor-
tant point of departure of our proof from previous approaches, which used an assumption of independence
between the devices or a limitation of the adversary in order to automatically obtain that (an even stronger
form of) the condition held in all rounds without requiring any conditioning.
We refer to Section 3.1 for a description of the events CHSHAB and VIOLAB appearing in the statement
of the lemma.
Lemma 10. Let ˆADV be uniformly distributed in {0, 1}αm, and η, ε > 0 be such that the following holds:
Pr
(
CHSHAB(η) ∧ GUESSBE |ADV = ˆADV
) ≥ ε,
and let α = |ADV|/m. Then there exists a universal constant Cν > 0, a ν ≤ Cν
√
log(1/ε)/m, an
i0 ∈ [m] and a set Gi0 ⊆ ({0, 1, 2} × {0, 1} × {0, 1}3)i0−1 such that for every (x, y, a, b, e) ∈ Gi0 , there is
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a choice of xˆ>i0 , yˆ>i0 and an ˆADV consistent with ((x, xˆ>i0), (y, yˆ>i0), a, b) such that the following hold:
max
{∥∥∥ρAi0 Xi0Yi0 − ρAi0 ⊗
(1
6 ∑x,y
|x, y〉〈x, y|
)∥∥∥
1
,
∥∥∥ρBi0 Xi0Yi0 − ρBi0 ⊗
(1
6 ∑x,y
|x, y〉〈x, y|
)∥∥∥
1
}
≤ ν, (2)
VIOLAB(i0) ≤ 3η + ν, (3)
Pr(GUESSBE (i0)) ≥ 1− 12 ln(2)α − ν, (4)
where in (2) the state ρAi0Bi0 Xi0Yi0 is the (normalized) state of the corresponding systems in round i0, con-
ditioned on (x, y, a, b, e), and similarly in (3) and (4) the violation is estimated conditioned on previous
input/outputs to the devices being (x, y, a, b), and on Eve making her measurement based on the inputs
(x, 2, xˆ>i0) and (y, 1, yˆ>i0) and advice string ˆADV, and obtaining outcomes e as her prediction in rounds
C∩ {1, . . . , i0 − 1}.
The proof of Lemma 10 in given in Section 4.
3.3.3 The guessing lemma
We state the last lemma required for the proof of Theorem 8. A similar lemma already appeared in [VV11].
Here we give a slightly more general version of the lemma stated in a form that can be directly used in the
proof of the theorem.
Lemma 11 (Guessing lemma). Let δ, ν, η > 0. Suppose given six bipartite states ρxyAB , where x ∈ {0, 1, 2},
y ∈ {0, 1}, such that the following hold:
1. If ρA = (1/6)∑xy TrB(ρxyAB) and ρB = (1/6)∑xy TrA(ρxyAB),
1
6 ∑x,y
∥∥ρA − ρxyA ∥∥1 ≤ ν and 16 ∑x,y
∥∥ρB − ρxyB ∥∥1 ≤ ν, (5)
2. There exists observables Ax = A0x − A1x, By = B0y − B1y on A,B respectively that satisfy
1
4
(
Tr
(
(A0 ⊗ B0)ρ00AB
)
+ Tr
(
(A0 ⊗ B1)ρ01AB
)
+ Tr
(
(A1 ⊗ B0)ρ10AB
)− Tr((A1 ⊗ B1)ρ11AB)
)
≥
√
2
2
− η,
3. Bob’s measurement B1 produces outcome b1 ∈ {0, 1} with probability 1− δ, when performed on his
share of ρ21AB:
Tr((Id⊗Bb11 )ρ21AB) ≥ 1− δ.
Then the condition
δ ≥
(√2− 1
2
− η
)
− 75ν
must hold.
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Proof. For every (a, b, x, y) ∈ {0, 1}2 × {0, 1, 2} × {0, 1} let p(a, b|x, y) := Tr((Aax ⊗ Bby)ρxyAB). Con-
dition (5) implies that the distribution p is approximately no-signalling, in the following sense: on average
over the choice of a uniformly random pair (x, y), the statistical distance
1
6 ∑x,y
∑
a
∣∣∣∑
b
p(a, b|x, y) − 1
2 ∑
y′
(
∑
b
p(a, b|x, y′)
)∣∣∣ ≤ 1
6 ∑x,y
∑
a
∣∣Tr((Aax ⊗ Id)(ρxyAB − ρxAB))∣∣
≤ 1
6 ∑x,y
∥∥ρxyAB − ρxAB∥∥1
≤ 2ν,
and a similar bound holds for the marginals on B. Lemma 9.5 in [Hol09] implies that there exists a distribu-
tion q(a, b|x, y) such that q is (perfectly) no-signalling, and moreover, on average over (x, y) the statistical
distance ‖p(·, ·|x, y) − q(·, ·|x, y)‖1 ≤ 10ν. In particular, the second assumption in the lemma implies that
the distribution q must violate the CHSH inequality by at least
√
2/2 − η − 15ν, and the third assump-
tion implies that ∑a q(a, 1|2, 1) ≥ 1− δ − 60ν. Applying the bound (A.11) derived in the supplementary
information to [PAM+10] with I/4 =
√
2/2− η − 15ν we obtain the inequality claimed in the lemma.
3.3.4 Proof of Theorem 8
We give the proof of Theorem 8, assuming the lemmas stated in the three previous subsections.
Proof of Theorem 8. Let (X, Y, A, B) be random variables describing Alice and Bob’s choice of inputs toA
and B respectively, and the outputs obtained, in an execution of Protocol A. Let E = E( ˆADV) be the random
variable that describes the outcome of the measurement on E described in Lemma 9, when the advice bits
ˆADV are selected uniformly at random (independently from A and B). Denote by ADV = fADV(BC)ABBB
the “correct” advice bits.
The proof proceeds by contradiction. Assume that there existed a pair of devices (A,B) such that
Pr
(
CHSHAB(B, η)
) ≥ ε, Hεmin(BC|XYABBBE) < κ|C|, (6)
where ε, η, κ are as in the statement of the theorem. Denote GUESSBE ( ˆADV) the event that E = BC. Using
Lemma 9, we deduce from (6) that the following must hold:
Pr
(
CHSHAB(B, η) ∧ GUESSBE ( ˆADV)| ˆADV = ADV
)
= Pr
(
GUESSBE ( ˆADV)|CHSHAB(B, η), ˆADV = ADV
)
· Pr (CHSHAB(B, η)| ˆADV = ADV)
≥ CE(ε/m)6 · ε, (7)
where CE is the constant from Lemma 9. Since the rounds B are chosen uniformly at random, Claim 12
below states that, for any 0 ≤ β ≤ 1:
Pr
(
CHSHAB((1 + β)η)|CHSHAB(B, η)
) ≥ 1− e−2β2η2γm, (8)
where γ = |B|/m. Choose β = 1/3, and let η′ := 4η/3. Provided Cγ is chosen large enough, the choice of
γ made in the theorem is such that γ ≥ log(2m6/CEε7)/((2/9)η2m), so that e−2β2η2γm ≤ CEε7/(2m6).
Hence we obtain the following by combining (7) and (8):
Pr
(
CHSHAB(η′) ∧ GUESSBE ( ˆADV)| ˆADV = ADV
) ≥ CE(ε7/(2m6)) =: ε′. (9)
14
We may now apply Lemma 10. Let ν = Cν
√
log(1/ε′)/m, and i0 ∈ [m] be the “good” round that is
promised by the lemma. We proceed to show that the existence of such a round leads to a contradiction by
appealing to the guessing lemma, Lemma 11.
Consider the following setup. Alice, Bob and Eve prepare their devices by selecting a random string of
inputs xˆ, yˆ for Eve, except that xˆi0 = 2 and yˆi0 = 1 always. Eve guesses the advice bits ˆADV at random
and makes a prediction E = e. Alice and Bob then use their devices up to round i0 − 1 by choosing inputs
(x<i0 , y<i0) = (xˆ<i0 , yˆ<i0). They verify that the resulting outputs a<i0 , b<i0 are such that
(x<i0 , y<i0 , a<i0 , b<i0 , e<i0) ∈ Gi0 ;
if not they abort. Upon having succeeded in this conditioning they separate and play the guessing game.
Alice holds system A, while Bob holds system B.
Lemma 10 shows that all conditions in Lemma 11 are satisfied: as a result, it must be that
12 ln(2)α + ν ≥
(√2− 1
2
− 6η′ − 2ν
)
− 75ν.
By definition, provided the constant Cν is large enough we have α ≤ κ/6 + 2γ + ν, where we used that
|C| ≤ m/6 + 10√m = m/6 + O(√ln(1/ε)), as enforced in the protocol, and η′ = 4/3η. Re-arranging
terms and using the definition of ν and γ we obtain the condition
κ >
√
2− 1
4 ln(2)
− 4
ln(2)
η −O
( log(1/ε)
η2m
)
,
which, given the choice of κ made in the theorem, is a contradiction provided Cε is chosen small enough.
Claim 12. Let η, γ > 0. The following holds for any 0 ≤ β ≤ 1:
Pr
S
(
CHSH((1 + β)η)|CHSH(S, η)) ≥ 1− e−2β2η2γm,
where the probability is taken over the choice of a random subset S ⊆ [m] of size |S| = γm.
Proof. Consider a given run of the protocol. Suppose that the fraction of rounds in which the CHSH
condition is not satisfied is at least (1 − opt) + (1 + β)η. By a standard Chernoff bound, a randomly
chosen set S ⊆ [m] will of size γm will have at least ((1 − opt) + η)γm of its rounds with inputs
corresponding to the CHSH condition being violated, except with probability at most e−2β2η2γm.
4 Proof of Lemma 10
This section is devoted to the proof of Lemma 10. Let D be the event CHSHAB(η) ∧ GUESSBE : the main
assumption of the lemma states that Pr(D|ADV = ˆADV) ≥ ε. We first prove two preliminary claims which
establish that, provided ε is not too small, conditioning on D does not affect either the distribution of inputs
(Xi, Yi) or the reduced density matrices of the inner state of each device’s system in most rounds i by too
much.
Claim 13. Suppose that, in Protocol B, Alice and Bob choose inputs (X, Y) ∈ {0, 1, 2}m × {0, 1}m uni-
formly at random, obtaining outcomes A, B ∈ {0, 1}m . Suppose that E is measured using Eve’s guessing
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measurement (as described in Lemma 9) with inputs (Xˆ, Yˆ) = (X, Y) and advice bits ˆADV = ADV, re-
sulting in an outcome E ∈ {0, 1}|C| . Let PXiYi be the marginal distribution of the inputs in the i-th round,
conditioned on (X<i, Y<i, A<i, B<i, E<i) = (x<i, y<i, a<i, b<i, e<i) ∈ D<i, the projection of D on the first
(i − 1) coordinates. Then the following bound holds on expectation over (x<i, y<i, a<i, b<i, e<i):
1
m ∑
i
∥∥PXiYi −U3×2∥∥1 ≤
√
log(1/ε)
2m
,
where U3×2 is the uniform distribution on {0, 1, 2} × {0, 1}.
Proof. The Shannon entropy H(X, Y) = log(6)m, and conditioned on D, H(X, Y|D) ≥ log(6)m −
log(1/ε). Applying the chain rule,
1
m ∑
i
H(Xi, Yi|X<i, Y<i, D<i) ≥ log(6)− log(1/ε)
m
.
Using the classical Pinsker’s inequality as ‖PXiYi − U3×2‖1 ≤
√
(log(6)− H(Xi, Yi))/2 and Jensen’s
inequality we get
1
m ∑
i
∥∥PXiYi −U3×2∥∥1 ≤
√
log(1/ε)
2m
,
proving the claim.
The fact that D depends both on the choice of inputs (X, Y) and on the adversary’s measurement out-
come implies that conditioning on D could not only bias the distribution of (X, Y) but also introduce cor-
relations between (X, Y) and the reduced state ρAB of the devices. The following claim shows that, if D
is an event with large enough probability, the correlations introduced by this conditioning do not affect the
reduced state on either A or B by too much, for most rounds i.
Claim 14. Consider the same situation as described in Claim 13. Let ρAiXiYi denote the reduced den-
sity of the joint state of systems A (in round i) and Xi, Yi, conditioned on (X<i, Y<i, A<i, B<i, E<i) =
(x<i, y<i, a<i, b<i, e<i) ∈ D<i. Then the following holds on expectation over (x<i, y<i, a<i, b<i, e<i):
1
m ∑
i
∥∥∥ρAiXiYi − ρAi ⊗
(1
6 ∑x,y
|x, y〉〈x, y|
)∥∥∥
1
≤ 4
√
log(1/ε)/m. (10)
Moreover, the same bound holds when Ai is replaced by Bi.
Proof. We use Claim 27. Alice’s sequential measurements are taken to be the ones performed on A, while
Bob’s measurement is the combination of the measurements on B, together with Eve’s measurement, on
inputs X, Y and advice bits ˆADV = ADV obtained from B. We set X in the claim to be XY here, and the
outcomes B in the claim to BE here. Together with the assumption Pr(D| ˆADV = ADV) ≥ ε, the claim
shows that
1
m ∑
i
I
(Ai; XiYi|D<i)ρAiXiYi ≤
log(1/ε)
m
.
Using Pinsker’s inequality (1) together with Jensen’s inequality,
1
m ∑
i
∥∥∥ρAiXiYi − ρAi ⊗
(1
6 ∑xy
|x, y〉〈x, y|
)∥∥∥
1
≤ 4
√
log(1/ε)/m,
where we used Claim 13 to show that the marginal distribution of (Xi, Yi) is close to uniform on {0, 1, 2} ×
{0, 1}, even conditioned on D<i.
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The following claim replaces the event that the CHSH condition is satisfied in a large fraction of rounds
by the event that their exists many rounds in which the CHSH condition is likely to be satisfied (when
evaluated on the state of the devices in that round).
Claim 15. There exists a set T ⊆ [m] such that |T| ≥ 2m/3, and a subset D′ ⊆ D such that Pr(D′|D) ≥
1/2 and for every i ∈ T, conditioned on ˆADV = ADV and on inputs and outputs to the devices in rounds
prior to i being in D′, the condition VIOLAB(i) ≤ 3η + 6
√
ln(1/ε)/m holds.
Proof. Let Zi ∈ {0, 1} be 1 if and only if the CHSH condition is not satisfied in round i. By definition,
E[Zi] = (1 − opt) + VIOLAB(i). Let Wi = E[Zi] − Zi and W≤i = W1 + · · · + Wi. (W≤i)i is a
Martingale, and by Azuma’s inequality, for any β > 0
Pr
( 1
m ∑
i
VIOLAB(i) + (1− opt) > 1
m ∑
i
Zi + β
)
= Pr
( 1
m ∑
i
Wi > β
)
≤ e−β2m/2.
Since the string ˆADV is chosen by the adversary uniformly at random, we may further condition the equa-
tions above on ˆADV = ADV without affecting their validity. Note that the event CHSHAB(η) is equivalent
to 1m ∑i Zi ≤ (1 − opt) + η. Choosing β =
√
2 ln(2/ε)/m, so that e−β2m/2 < ε/4, and using the
assumption Pr(D| ˆADV = ADV) ≥ ε to further condition on D = CHSHAB(η) ∧ GUESSBE we get
Pr
( 1
m ∑
i
VIOLAB(i) > η + β
∣∣D, ˆADV = ADV) ≤ 1/2.
The quantity VIOLAB(i) is a nonnegative number which only depends on the state of the devices in round
i, itself only depending on the string of inputs and outputs observed thus far. Applying Markov’s inequality,
the condition above implies that there is a set T ⊆ [m] of size |T| ≥ 2m/3 and a subset D′ ⊆ D of size
Pr(D′|D) ≥ 1/2 such that for every i ∈ T it holds that VIOLAB(i) ≤ 3(η + β), provided previous inputs
and outputs of the devices were in D′.
Proof of Lemma 10. Let D′ be the set from Claim 15. Consider the state of the devices A and B in an arbi-
trary round i of the protocol. By applying Markov’s inequality to the bound (10) from Claim 14, we obtain a
set |T′| ⊆ [m] of size |T′| ≥ 11m/12 and a subset D′′ ⊆ D′ satisfying Pr(D′′|D′) ≥ 1/2 such that, for ev-
ery i ∈ T′, conditioned on ˆADV = ADV and (X<i, Y<i, A<i, B<i, E<i) = (x<i, y<i, a<i, b<i, e<i) ∈ D′′<i,
both bounds ∥∥∥ρAiXiYi − ρAi ⊗
(1
6 ∑x,y
|x, y〉〈x, y|
)∥∥∥
1
≤ 200
√
log(1/ε)/m
and the analogous bound where Ai is replaced by Bi hold. Letting T′′ = T′ ∩ T, where T is the set from
Claim 15, both the bound above and the condition VIOLAB(i) ≤ 3η + 6
√
ln(1/ε)/m hold simultaneously
in the rounds from T′′ (conditioned on previous inputs and outputs being in D′′). Furthermore, note that
whether both conditions are satisfied or not only depends on the (post-selected) state of the protocol in round
i, itself only depending on subsequent choices of inputs and outputs in the protocol to the extent that the
condition ˆADV = ADV is satisfied. Hence as long as the advice bits ˆADV that Eve uses to select the mea-
surement on her system have a positive probability of being the correct advice bits, given the data generated
up to round i − 1, both bounds must hold verbatim. As a consequence, for any fixed (x, y, a, b, e) ∈ D′′
<i
there exists a string (xˆ>i, yˆ>i, aˆ>i, bˆ>i) from which advice bits ˆADV>i can be computed such that if Eve
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makes the corresponding measurement, and obtains outputs that match e<i, the bounds will hold irrespective
of what might happen if the protocol was to be run for rounds after i. Thus conditions (2) and (3) in the
lemma hold for any round i ∈ T′′.
It remains to show that condition (3) holds simultaneously in some round i0. Since by construction
Pr(D′′| ˆADV = ADV) ≥ ε/4, multiplying by Pr( ˆADV = ADV) = 2−αm, applying Baye’s rule, and using
the definition of D = CHSHAB(η) ∧ GUESSBE , we get
m
∏
i=1
Pr
(
GUESSBE (i)|D′′<i
) ≥ (ε/4) 2−αm.
Taking logarithms and applying Markov’s inequality, there is a subset S ⊆ [m] of size |S| ≥ m/2 such that
for every i ∈ S,
− ln Pr (GUESSBE (i)|D′′<i) ≤ 2(ln(2)α + ln(4/ε)/m),
implying that, for all i ∈ S,
Pr
(
GUESSBE (i)|D′′<i) ≥ 1− 2 ln(2)α− 2 ln(4/ε)/m. (11)
Let i0 be any round in T′′ ∩ S. To obtain (4) we need to further condition (11) on inputs in round i0 to be
the pair (2, 1), which using Claim 13 happens with probability 1/6 ±O(√ln(1/ε)/m). Choosing Cν in
the lemma to be a large enough constant, all three conditions are satisfied.
5 The quantum reconstruction paradigm
In this section we prove a general lemma, Lemma 22 in Section 5.2 below, from which Lemma 9 is deduced
in Section 5.3. We start with some useful preliminary definitions and known results.
5.1 Combinatorial preliminaries
We first define extractors.
Definition 16. A function Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a quantum-proof (or simply quantum)
(k, ε)-strong extractor if for all states ρXE classical on X with Hmin(X|E) ≥ k, and for a uniform seed
Y ∈ {0, 1}d, we have
1
2
∥∥ρExt(X,Y)YE − ρUm ⊗ ρY ⊗ ρE∥∥1 ≤ ε,
where ρUm is the fully mixed state on a system of dimension 2m.
We will use list-decodable codes.
Definition 17. A code C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n¯ is said to be (ε, L)-list-decodable if every Hamming ball of
relative radius 1/2− ε in {0, 1}n¯ contains at most L codewords.
There exist list-decodable codes with the following parameters.
Lemma 18. For every n ∈ N and δ > 0 there is a code Cn,δ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n¯ , which is (δ, 1/δ2)-list-
decodable, with n¯ = poly(n, 1/δ). Furthermore, Cn,δ can be evaluated in time poly(n, 1/δ) and n¯ can be
assumed to be a power of 2.
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For example, Guruswami et al. [GHSZ02] combine a Reed-Solomon code with a Hadamard code, ob-
taining such a list-decodable code with n¯ = O(n/δ4).
We will also use the notion of weak design, as defined in [RRV02].
Definition 19. A family of sets S1, · · · , Sm ⊂ [d] is a weak (t, r, m, d)-design if
1. For all i, |Si| = t.
2. For all i, ∑i−1j=1 2
|Sj∩Si| ≤ rm.
There exists designs with the following parameters.
Lemma 20 ([RRV02, Lemma 17]). For every t, m ∈ N there exists a weak (t, 1, m, d)-design S1, . . . , Sm ⊂
[d] such that d = t
⌈
t
ln 2
⌉ ⌈log 4m⌉ = O(t2 log m). Moreover, such a design can be found in time
poly(m, d) and space poly(m).
Finally, we describe Trevisan’s extractor construction.
Definition 21. For a one-bit extractor C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}, and for a weak (t, r, m, d)-design
S1, · · · , Sm ⊂ [d], we define the m-bit extractor ExtC : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m as
ExtC(x, y) := C(x, yS1), . . . , C(x, ySm).
5.2 The reconstruction lemma
The following lemma is implicit in the proof of security of Trevisan’s extractor construction paradigm
against quantum adversaries given in [DPVR12]. A similar lemma also appeared in [VV11, Lemma 13],
where the code C was specialized to the t-XOR code. For completeness, we state and sketch the proof of a
more general variant of that lemma.
Lemma 22. Let n, m, r, t, L be integers and ε > 0. Let C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n¯ be a (ε2/(8m2), L)-list-
decodable code, where n¯ = 2t. Let ExtC be the extractor obtained by combining C with a (t, r, m, d) design
as in Definition 21.
Let ρXE be a state such that X is a random variable distributed over n-bit strings. Let Um be uniformly
distributed over m-bit strings, and suppose that
‖ρExtC(X,Y)YE − ρUm ⊗ ρY ⊗ ρE
∥∥
1
> ε, (12)
where Y is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}d. Then there exists fixed strings y1, . . . , yrm ∈ {0, 1}t such
that, given the {(yi, C(X)yi)} as advice, with probability at least ε2/(8m2) over the choice of x ∼ pX and
her own randomness an “adversary” Eve holding system E can produce a string z such that dH(z, C(x)) ≤
1/2− ε2/(8m2). In particular, Eve can recover L strings x˜i ∈ {0, 1}n such that there exits i, x˜i = x.
Proof. Proposition 4.4 from [DPVR12] shows that a standard hybrid argument, together with properties of
Trevisan’s extractor (specifically the use of the seed through combinatorial designs), can be used to show
the following claim.
Claim 23. Assume (12) holds. Then there exists strings y1, . . . , yrm ∈ {0, 1}t , and for every y ∈ {0, 1}t a
binary measurement, depending on the {(yi, C(X)yi)}, on E that outputs C(X, y) with probability at least
1/2 + ε/m on average over y. Formally,
∥∥ρCt(X)YYVE − ρU1 ⊗ ρY ⊗ ρVE
∥∥
1
>
ε
m
, (13)
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where Y is a random variable uniformly distributed over {0, 1}t and V is a classical register containing the
{(yi, C(X)yi)}.
The next step is to argue that Eq. (13) implies that an adversary given access to E′ = VE can predict
not only a random bit of C(X), but a string Z of length m such that Z agrees with C(X) in a significant
fraction of positions. This follows from an argument given in [KT08], and the following claim is proved
exactly as [VV11, Claim 15].
Claim 24. Suppose (13) holds. Then there exists a measurement F , with outcomes in {0, 1}n , such that
Pr
x∼pX, y∼Ut
(
C(x)y = C(F(VE))y
) ≥ 1
2
+
ε2
4m2
, (14)
where F(VE) denotes the outcome of F when performed on the state ρVE.
To conclude the argument, we use the error-correction properties of C to argue that Eve can decode her
string C(F(VE)) into an educated guess of x. Claim 24 shows that, on expectation over x, Eve’s string is
at Hamming distance 1/2 − ε2/(4m2) from the encoding of x. In particular, the distance will be at most
1/2 − ε2/(8m2) for a fraction at least ε2/(8m2) of x ∼ pX . Since, by assumption, C is (ε2/(8m2), L)-
list-decodable, for those x Eve can narrow down the possibilities to at most L distinct values.
5.3 Proof of Lemma 9
The proof of Lemma 9 follows immediately from Lemma 22 and an appropriate choice of parameters. Let
E denote the system made of the combination of XYABBBE , and let n = |C|. The assumption of the
lemma is that Hεmin(BC|E) < κn. Let m = κn + 1. Let C = Cn,δ, where δ = ε2/(32m2), be a (δ, 1/δ2)
list-decodable code, as promised by Lemma 18. Let ExtC be constructed from C and a (t, 1, m, d) design,
where t = log n¯ and d = O(t2 log m), as promised by Lemma 20.
It follows from the data processing inequality (see e.g. [KR11, Lemma V.1 (ii)]), our assumed upper
bound on Hεmin(BC|E), and our choice of m that Eq. (12) holds with (ε/2) in place of ε. Thinking of Eve as
simply outputting one of her L guesses x˜i chosen at random, we obtain that Eve’s guess will be successful
with probability at least ε2/(32Lm2). Overall, Eve needs m bits of advice, given which she can predict x
with success probability O(ε6/m6), given our choice of parameters.
6 Additional lemmas
Lemma 25 (Azuma-Hoeffding inequality). Let (Xk) be a martingale such that |Xk − Xk−1| ≤ ck for all k.
Then for all integers m and all t ≥ 0,
Pr
(
Xm − X0 ≥ t
) ≤ e−t2/(2 ∑k c2k).
Lemma 26. Let ε, δ, η, β > 0 and m an integer such that e−2β2δm < ε/2. Let X be a random variable
defined over m-bit strings. Suppose that Pr(∑i Xi ≤ ηm) ≥ ε. Then there exists a set G ⊆ {0, 1}m such
that Pr(G) ≥ ε/2 and for all x in G, for a fraction ≥ 1− δ of indices i ∈ [m],
Pr(Xi = 0|X<i = x<i) ≥ 1− η − β.
As a consequence, for a fraction at least 1− 2δ of i ∈ [m] there exists a set Gi ⊆ G such that Pr(Gi|G) ≥
1/2 and for every x<i ∈ Gi,
Pr(Xi = 0|X<i = x<i) ≥ 1− η − β.
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Proof. For every i ∈ [m] define
Bi =
{
(x1, . . . , xi−1, . . . , xm)| Pr(Xi = 1|X<i = x<i) ≥ η + β
}
,
let
B =
{
x
∣∣ ∑
i:x∈Bi
1 ≥ δm
}
,
and suppose towards a contradiction that Pr(B) ≥ 1− ε/2. Let Bˆ = {x ∈ B|∑i xi ≤ ηm}. By definition,
for every x ∈ B and at least a δ-fraction of indices i it holds that Pr(Xi = 1|X<i = x<i) ≥ η + β. Hence the
probability that x ∈ B has less than η indices j at which xj = 1 is at most e−2β2δm, i.e. Pr(Bˆ|B) ≤ e−2β2δm.
This shows that
Pr
(
∑
i
Xi > ηm
) ≥ Pr(B)(1− Pr(Bˆ|B)) ≥ (1− ε/2)(1− e−2β2δm) > 1− ε
given our assumption on ε, δ, η, β and m; a contradiction.
For the “consequence”, for any x ∈ G and i ∈ [m] let Yx,i = 1 if and only if the condition
Pr(Xi = 0|X<i = x<i) ≥ 1− η − β
is satisfied. We have shown Ex∈G,i∈[m]
[
Yx,i
] ≥ 1 − δ. The result is then a consequence of Markov’s
inequality.
Claim 27. Let ρ = ρAB be a bipartite state shared between Alice and Bob. Suppose Bob chooses x ∈ Xm
according to distribution (px), and applies a measurement with Krauss operators {Nbx}b∈Bm on B. Alice
sequentially applies a measurement with Krauss operators {Maixi}ai∈A on A, for i = 1, . . . , m. Let D ⊆
(X×A× B)m be a set of probability Pr(D) = ε. For i ∈ [m], let ρi be the state of the system ABXi after
i − 1 measurements have been performed by Alice, conditioned on (x<i, a<i, b<i) ∈ D<i:
ρi ∝ ∑
(x,a,b):(x<i,a<i,b<i)∈D<i
px
((
∏
j<i
M
aj
xj
)
⊗ Nbx
)
ρ
((
∏
j<i
(
M
aj
xj
)†)⊗ (Nbx)†
)
,
and ρi is normalized. Then the following bound holds:
∑
i
I(A : Xi|D<i)ρi ≤ log(1/ε).
Proof. We prove the lemma using standard techniques from quantum information theory; specifically the
proof of the Holevo-Schumacher-Westmoreland theorem [Hol98, Sch96]. We assume that the reader is
familiar with the coding and decoding strategies employed in that result, and in particular the notion of
typical subspace (see e.g. [Chapters 14 and 19][Wil11], and more specifically the proof of Theorem 19.3.1).
We prove the claim by describing an experiment by which Bob transmits H(X) bits of information to Alice
using only H(X) + log(1/ε)−∑i I(A : Xi)ρi bits of communication from him to Alice. This implies the
claimed inequality: if it did not hold Alice could guess Bob’s H(X) bits with success larger than 2−H(X)
simply by running the protocol by herself, and guessing Bob’s messages.
Suppose Alice and Bob share an infinite number of copies of ρ. For each i ∈ [m], Alice and Bob
also agree on a random code Ci ⊆ X K, where K is a large integer, such that |Ci| = 2KI(A:Xi|D<i)ρi . By the
properties of typical subspaces, with high probability over the choice of Ci the collection of states ⊗Kj=1ρi(x′j)
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for (x′1, . . . , x′K) ∈ C, where ρi(x′j) is the reduced density of ρi on A conditioned on Xi = x′j, are almost
perfectly distinguishable.3
The experiment proceeds as follows. The copies of ρ are grouped in groups of K. For each group, Bob
selects a random x = (xji)1≤i≤m,1≤j≤K ∈ (X m)K and applies the measurements {Nx j} in the j-th copy of
ρ in that group, obtaining an outcome bj ∈ Bm. For each i ∈ [m], Alice does the following, independently
for each group. She guesses whether Bob’s choice of (x1i , . . . , xKi ) is in Ci (the probability with which she
guesses this should be so is equal to the probability that xi ∈ Ci, i.e. 2K(I(A:Xi|D<i)ρi−H(Xi))). If so, she
performs the decoding measurement to recover xi. If not, she guesses (x1i , . . . , xKi ) according to p×K. She
then applies the measurements {Ma
j
i
x
j
i
} corresponding to the guessed (xji). At the end of the m repetitions,
Alice sends all her guesses, and her outcomes, to Bob.
Finally, Bob finds the first group of K states in which Alice’s guesses were all correct, and (xj, aj, bj) ∈
D (for each 1 ≤ j ≤ K). In any group, the probability that this event happens is 2−K(H(X)−∑i I(A:Xi|D<i)ρi )εK.
Moreover, note that Alice’s probability of correctly guessing Bob’s choice of (xji) is independent of (x
j
i).
Hence Bob can indicate to Alice the index of the first group of states on which she was correct by transmitting
O(K log(1/ε) + K(H(X)− ∑i I(A : Xi|D<i)ρi)) bits. Alice then knows all KH(X) bits of information
about Bob’s choices of x in the m rounds on the group of K states.
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